Introduction
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is usually given substantial credit for the liberalisation of world trade that took place after World War II. At the time it was formed in 1947, barriers to world trade were considerable. The Great Depression of the 1930s saw the imposition of higher tariffs, tighter import quotas, foreign exchange controls and discriminatory trade arrangements around the world (Irwin 2012) . World War II brought additional governmental controls on foreign trade. Had they remained in place, these restrictions would have stifled the growth of world trade in the postwar period, and presumably slowed the economic recovery from the war.
Of course, as is well known, leading countries met in Geneva in 1947 Round, 1974-79) had taken place (World Bank 1987, 134-35) . 3 This figure was widely accepted and frequently mentioned by policymakers and international organisations in the 1990s. 1 A figure of 40 per cent for average tariffs in 1947 would imply that the first 15 years of GATT made enormous progress in reducing applied tariffs. Unfortunately, although this figure has been widely cited, no source was provided and it has never been verified. By contrast, the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2007, 207) later suggested that average tariffs at the time of the GATT's founding were 'situated in a range between 20 and 30 per cent', implying that early reductions in applied tariffs were more modest.
The initial level of the average applied tariff matters for how we assess the GATT's early success in reducing tariffs. Going from 40 per cent in 1947 to 15 per cent in 1964 is quite different from going from 20 per cent to 15 per cent in the same period.
Determining the GATT's actual starting point is also relevant to a growing body of contemporary research, both theoretical and empirical, that seeks to provide conceptual foundations for the role and impact of the GATT and the WTO, as well as to provide empiricallybased estimates of this impact.
2 First, such pre-GATT tariff estimates may be a useful benchmark to compare against the non-cooperative Nash tariff that one might calculate in a computational model as the outcome of a multi-country 'trade war'. For example, Ossa (2014, p. 4122 ) finds in his seven-country computational model that the 'median Nash tariff across all countries is 58.1 percent which is remarkably close to the average tariff of 50 percent typically reported for the trade war following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.' Second, such estimates are important for understanding and contextualising the outcomes of negotiations under the early GATT Rounds, the micro-level bargaining analysis of which is subject to research informed by the newly available declassified data (for the Torquay Round of 1951, see Bagwell, Staiger and Yurukoglu 2015) .
In this chapter we review the scattered and incomplete evidence on tariff levels circa 1947 in an attempt to pin down the GATT's starting point in terms of tariff levels. We provide some new evidence on tariff levels and perform some new calculations (such as backcasting tariff rates from the 1960s) to shed light on the likely height of tariff barriers in place at this time. Our results
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See the references in Bown and Irwin (2015) . The first mention of the 40 per cent figure that we were able to find was in a New York Times article in September 1986 at the launch of the Uruguay Round.
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Recent surveys include those of Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (forthcoming) and Anderson (2016). 4 indicate that average tariff levels for the major GATT participants were about 22 per cent, much lower than the oft-cited 40 per cent figure. This leads us to the conclusion that the tariff reductions negotiated in the initial GATT rounds had a modest impact on average tariff levels. We also provide statistical evidence on whether the early GATT participants experienced noticeable reductions in their average tariffs as a result of the first negotiating rounds. Here we find some evidence of lower tariffs resulting for the GATT core countries of the US, UK, Canada, and Australia, relative to other contracting parties and non-GATT participants.
Finally, and although we find that the reduction in the average applied tariff before the Kennedy Round was apparently modest, this does not lead us to conclude that the GATT's early contribution to trade liberalisation was unimportant. For in addition to facilitating applied tariff reductions, the early GATT accomplished many things, most of which are arguably much more difficult to measure than tariffs and thus to capture empirically in summary statistics. These would include binding the negotiated tariff reductions for an extended period (made more permanent in 1955), establishing the generality of nondiscrimination through most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment, ensuring increased transparency of trade policy measures, and providing a forum for future negotiations and for the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes. All of these elements contributed to the rationalisation of trade policy and to the reduction of trade barriers and policy uncertainty. The focus of this chapter is simply on one element of the GATT's contribution, the reduction in average applied tariff levels.
B. Methods for measuring average tariff levels
Before presenting data on tariff levels for the period under study, the term 'average tariffs' deserves discussion. There is no unique way of measuring the level of a country's tariffs or comparing tariff levels between countries. In this section we therefore introduce the predominant approaches and discuss the trade-offs associated with each.
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I. Trade-weighted average tariffs
The easiest method for calculating average tariffs is simply to use the weighted average tariff, where the weights are the value of imports. This average tariff measure is straightforward to construct because it can readily be calculated from only two pieces of aggregate-level data for a country: it is defined as the value of a country's total customs revenue divided by the value of its total imports. Because data on these two components are frequently available, this measure can be calculated even without access to the individual, product-specific rates of duty in the country's tariff code. For the US, for example, data are reported on both the trade-weighted average tariff on total imports and the trade-weighted average tariff on dutiable imports.
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The most important problem with the import-weighted average tariff measure is its downward bias. Because imports of goods subject to high duties will be very small, those duties will receive low weights in the index and prohibitive duties will receive no weight in the calculation at all. An alternative approach to trade-weighting would be to use the imports of 'someone else' (e.g. the rest of the world) as opposed to the importing country itself, in order to construct the weights used in the measure. Of course, the major problem introduced by such an approach is that the measure is then no longer easily calculable from the readily available, aggregate-level customs revenue and total import value data. That is, such an approach would require detailed information on product-level tariff rates and product-level imports (of the 'someone else') and this would also require that the products be categorised under the same classification scheme across countries. As we describe in more detail below, achieving a productlevel classification scheme consistently defined across countries is a relatively recent (late twentieth century) historical phenomenon.
Second, in comparing the tariff levels of two countries, a higher trade-weighted average tariff does not necessarily mean that trade is more restricted or that it imposes a greater welfare cost than a lower tariff. The Anderson and Neary (2005) 'trade restrictiveness index' is an 3 These two measures often diverge substantially because many imports are given duty free status in the tariff code. Unfortunately, other countries do not report the average tariff on dutiable imports, which might be a more accurate indication of a country's protective duties on imported manufactures. Lloyd (2008) reports such data for Australia. 6 alternative method, albeit a fairly complicated and computationally challenging one, that attempts to deal with these problems in order to draw economic inference from measures of import protection. 4 Third, for the inter-temporal assessment of tariff policy changes, another problem with relying on trade-weighted averaging is that the weights (imports) may change from year to year for reasons that are completely independent of policy changes. For example, a negative supply shock abroad (e.g. a drought or a flood) could lead to a severe decline in quantities of imports of certain products that will affect the relative weighting. This could similarly result from productor industry-specific (positive or negative) demand shocks at home. For this reason, it is often difficult to interpret changes in the import-weighted average tariff as necessarily reflecting a change in commercial policy that would arise through changes to the official tariff rates.
II. Simple average tariffs
A second approach is simply to take an unweighted average of all tariff rates across all products within a country. However, unlike the trade-weighted average, which can be calculated solely from data on customs revenue and the total value of imports, calculation of even the simple average requires much additional information. Furthermore, even if the problems of obtaining such additional information can be overcome (so that the measure can be constructed), there are still difficulties in drawing inference from cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons of simple average tariffs.
The first requirement for construction of a simple average tariff is the conversion of all non-ad valorem tariffs -e.g. specific duties and compound rates -into ad valorem equivalent rates. This requires, at a minimum, additional information on import prices.
The second requirement is for access to detailed, consistently-defined, product-level tariff rates listed in the tariff code. If the unweighted average is simply an arithmetic average of the duties in the individual lines in the tariff code, the calculation is potentially misleading if there are 4 Literature on empirical applications and estimating such trade restrictiveness indices on contemporary tariff data includes the studies by Olarreaga (2008, 2009 ) and Kee, Neagu and Nicita (2013) and on US historical tariff data by Irwin (2010). 7 many rates for a small number of imports and few rates for the broadest base of imports. 5 Thus it may be difficult make comparisons between countries if the countries being compared do not use the same nomenclature for defining the scope of products and tariff lines. The Brussels tariff nomenclature (BTN) was not established by the Customs Co-operation Council until December 1950 and slowly came into use during that decade. It is only after this time that disaggregated tariff averages could be usefully compared between countries. The lack of any comparable system during the early post-war era is likely to severely hamper any 'bottom up' effort to generate average tariff measures that would build from the product level. And, of course, the US never adopted the BTN.
The concerns associated with this second requirement are particularly relevant for trade policy analysis even as late as 1988, the point at which the major trading economies finally introduced and adopted the common Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) for product-level tariff classification.
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One of the resulting benefits has been to make such accounting exercises for constructing measures of average tariffs potentially more meaningful across countries and over time; however, it is important to note that this innovation did not occur until relatively late in the twentieth century.
Finally, in addition to there being no ideal weighting scheme in creating a tariff index or tariff average, even basic information on tariffs was not readily available in the 1930s and 1940s.
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While the US was transparent about its tariff code, this was not the case for most other countries.
And, for the tariff schedules of the leading countries that may have existed, no government or international organisation made the effort to compile the rates so as to make them comparable across countries. Not until the Kennedy Round in the 1960s did GATT negotiators have access to 5 To take an extreme example, if a country has only two tariff lines and two rates of duties, 100 per cent on imported rhinoceroses and 0 per cent on everything else, the average duty is 50 per cent because every duty gets a weight of 1/n in the calculation where n is simply the number of tariff lines.
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Since 1988, the Harmonized System has adopted a definition of roughly 5200 products that are common at the 6-digit level across all countries. The products at the 6-digit level are also consistently defined over time, subject to revisions -such as those taking place in 1996, 2002, 2007, and 2012 -that have changed the definition of about 200 products at each revision.
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The League of Nations (1927) presented some tariff index numbers in preparation for the 1927 World Economic Conference. 8 detailed figures on average tariffs using various weighting schemes. We will show later how the different calculations under these schemes affect the reported tariff averages.
C.
Initial evidence based on trade-weighted and simple average tariffs Unlike today, there was no GATT or WTO secretariat in 1947 that could present compilations and summary statistics on the tariff codes of the participating governments. In addition, it is only recently that official, declassified documents have begun to be made publicly available so as to
give researchers the opportunity to judge the results of the first few GATT rounds.
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Thus this section describes some sources that we can use to fill in the gaps in our knowledge until such time as the tariff schedules of different countries can be analysed in greater detail. Table 1 presents the first body of evidence, which is based on the import-weighted average tariffs for 1947 and other selected years over the 1929-1964 period for the main GATT participants as well as a number of other major economies for which data are available.
I. Trade-weighted average tariffs in 1947 and peak tariffs from 1929-1947
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The column for 1947 (Geneva) The results of the first bilateral negotiations have recently been posted on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattbilaterals_e/indexbyround_e.htm . Nevertheless, even eventual analysis of detailed tariff schedules in place at that time will still run into the averaging problems described in the previous section that are associated with inconsistent product nomenclature across countries and over time. The average tariff is calculated as the value of customs revenue divided by the value of imports. Like Clemens and Williamson (2004) , our source is International Historical Statistics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) originally compiled by Brian Mitchell and now edited and updated by Palgrave Macmillan. 9 postwar duties may be a result of inflation and specific duties; this is certainly the case for the US, but the degree to which other countries used specific duties is not as well known. Of the exceptions, the substantially higher average tariffs for the UK may be due to fiscal reasons. However, and with the exception of the UK, the data presented in Table 1 do not suggest that the average tariffs in 1947 were close to 40 per cent for any of these countries.
Another possibility is that countries had already reduced their average tariffs substantially by 1947, and so scholarly reference to 'pre-GATT' tariffs at rates of 40 per cent or more had in mind the peak levels that were reached either during, or in the aftermath of, the Great Depression.
We examine this possibility as Table 1 also reports the peak level for the trade-weighted average tariff by country over the 1929-1947 period. However, while the peak levels were significantly higher than 1947 (or even 1939) levels for almost all countries, in only five (Australia, India, New Zealand, Portugal and the UK) of the 25 countries in Table 1 and this measure of tariffs for the US peaked at 59.1 per cent in 1932. While this particular data series is not, to our knowledge, systematically available for all GATT countries for this time period, it is possible that scholars could be making reference to this series (at least for the US) when they are describing pre-GATT average tariffs at 40 per cent or above. 10 The US International Trade Commission (2014 , Table 1 ) reports values for the trade-weighted average tariff data that are slightly different from those reported in the International Historical Statistics and which we report in Table 1 . In particular, they find the US trade-weighted average tariff was 7.9 per cent as opposed to 8.2 per cent in 1947.
Of course, as already noted, the import-weighted average tariff may also be downward biased. Data on tariff levels presented below will allow us to assess the extent of that potential bias.
II. Later evidence: simple average tariffs
While the trade-weighted average tariff data contained in Table 1 are the only broad tariff measures that exist, to our knowledge, for the period just prior to the first GATT negotiations in 1947, the discussions that eventually led to the European Common Market meant that more attention was paid to European tariff levels throughout the 1950s. As a result, published reports of tariff averages started to become available, although still relatively infrequently.
One of the first compilations was made by Woytinsky and Woytinsky (1955) , which is presented in Table 2 as an unweighted tariff average for 1949 (after the first Geneva Round but before the second Annecy Round). Furthermore, a comparison of these simple averages in Table 2 with the 1949 trade-weighted averages reported in Table 1 reveals mixed results -for Denmark, Sweden, and the UK the simple average is lower, whereas for Benelux, Norway, France, and Portugal the simple average is substantially higher. Once we move into the late 1950s and especially the early 1960s, published data on average tariff levels are more readily available.
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In 1958, the EEC was formed with its common external tariff, which required extensive tariff harmonisation among the six European participants. In addition, the US was preparing to launch the Kennedy Round, whose purpose was to reduce the external tariff of the EEC and hence the margin of preference for intra-EEC trade. Tables 5, 6 and 7 present average tariffs for the late 1950s and early 1960s prior to the Kennedy Round negotiations. Table 5 shows the average US and EEC tariff before the 1961-62 Dillon Round. This table also reveals the bias of import-weighted versus unweighted tariff averages. In both the US and the EEC, the import-weighted tariff is about 8 per cent whereas the unweighted tariff is about 14 per cent. Therefore, the unweighted average tariff is about double the weighted average tariff. Tables 6 and 7 show the pre-Kennedy Round average tariffs that are, once again, in the low teens. However, these tariffs are for dutiable imports, meaning that duty free imports were not included in the calculation. Still, the unweighted tariffs are in the mid-teens for both the US and the EEC; the weighting scheme seems to be much less important when considering only dutiable imports.
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To sum up, from the evidence that we have been able to compile, the average tariff in the mid-1950s for the major players in the GATT was about 15 per cent.
D. United States: evidence on levels and cuts
This section provides additional information on the tariff level and reductions in US tariffs during The US is the most transparent country in terms of its tariff policy, and also the country with the best information on its average tariff. In 1947, the average US tariff on total imports was 7.9 per cent and the average tariff on dutiable imports was 20.1 per cent. This had already come down sharply from pre-war levels; the rates were 14.4 per cent and 37.3 per cent, respectively, in 1939. As Irwin (1998) points out, this decline is mainly a result of the impact of higher inflation during and after the war in reducing the ad valorem equivalent of the many specific duties in the tariff code.
14 Throughout the 1950s, the average tariff on imports was about 6 per cent and the average tariff on dutiable imports was about 12 per cent; neither of these figures changed much over the course of the decade.
The US Tariff Commission (1948) also presented clear details on the degree to which US tariffs were reduced in the reciprocal trade agreements reached in the 1930s as well as the 1947
Geneva negotiations. Table 8 reports the average pre-agreement rates (those established in the Tariff Act of 1930, the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff), those that prevailed in 1947 prior to the Geneva conference, and those implemented in 1948, the year after the GATT was created. As See also Crucini (1994) .
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reduced those tariffs by a third, cutting them to 32 per cent by 1947. These tariff changes are based on fixed weights (imports in 1939) and therefore focus exclusively on change in tariff rates as a result of trade negotiations. The calculation does not take into account the impact of higher import prices or changing import composition on the import-weighted average tariff during this period.
Finally, Table 8 also provides useful information on the variation in tariff reductions across different tariff schedule categories for the US during this period. Some schedules saw large reductions (duties on flax, hemp and jute manufactures were cut by 47 per cent), while others were cut very little (chemicals and oils were cut by only 3 per cent) in the first round.
E. Backcasting to 1947
Given the lack of any official information on tariff levels circa 1947, one way to ascertain those levels is to take later tariff levels known with confidence and to 'backcast' (as opposed to forecast) the 1947 tariff levels based on the tariff reductions that are thought to have taken place.
As we have seen, the earliest, most solid estimates of the post-war average tariff come from calculations done during the Kennedy Round. Around 1964, before the Kennedy Round tariff cuts had been negotiated, the average combined tariff for the US, European Economic Community (EEC-6), the UK, and Japan -the four major players -was 14 per cent. This figure is based on the import-weighted average of tariff rates in each of the four. The country tariff averages are from Preeg (1970, 208-11) , also presented here as column 1 of Table 6 and column 2 of Table 7 . These are combined together in one figure by weighting the four tariffs by the region's value of imports in 1964; these weights are 0.4 for the EEC, 0.3 for the US, 0.175 for the UK, and 0.125 for Japan (WTO 2007, p. 208) . Table 7 reveals two main results. First, the average tariffs were roughly comparable across countries, ranging from 12.8 for the EEC to 16.6 for the UK. Second, the weighting scheme (whether unweighted or weighted by world imports or the country's imports) does not make much difference to these country averages.
If we therefore accept that the average tariff was about 14 per cent before the Kennedy Round -something that One way to verify this calculation is to take the GATT's calculated average tariffs for 1952, presented in Table 5 , and see if they match what emerges from the backcast. The average shown in essentially the same as our backcast result for that year.
F. Assessing the average tariff data: is the time path meaningful?
Having established the average unweighted level of the tariff in 1947 at about 22 per cent, we next return to our data on the import-weighted tariff average in order to examine empirically whether there are discernable reductions in this particular measure of tariffs following the initial GATT negotiating rounds. One way to assess whether the data on trade-weighted average tariffs presented in Table 1 are at all informative, for example, is to examine whether the data are at least consistent with other accounts of the results of the GATT tariff negotiations taking place at the time. It is worth recalling our discussion in Section B, however, where it was noted that these particular tariff measures are probably inferior to the unweighted tariff averages. They are downward biased, changes in these particular tariff measures may reflect factors other than changes in official tariff rates, and these other factors include import prices and the composition of imports, both of which were changing rapidly in the immediate postwar period. Nevertheless, the advantage of these 17 As the WTO (2007, 181) notes: 'We lack appropriate data to gauge the precise extent of the tariff cuts. Only for the United States is a detailed analysis available. However, it is generally recognized that the United States made the most generous tariff concessions reflecting its strong economic situation and relatively high level of tariff protection. ' The WTO (2007, 206) also states: 'For France and the United Kingdom, no average rate of reduction has been provided in the various government reports dealing with the results of these negotiations. The tariffs of the Benelux countries at the time had been recognized to be well below the average prevailing in the other industrial countries and therefore these countries made concessions principally by binding most of their tariffs at the already low levels. It is therefore plausible to assume that the average tariff reduction on industrial products of all industrial countries achieved in 1947 was somewhat less than the reduction observed for the United States.' 16 measures is that they are available on an annual basis; thus we examine whether they reveal evidence on the tariff reductions undertaken during this period.
We perform a set of difference-in-difference regressions to help assess whether the intertemporal patterns in the import-weighted average tariff data over the 1944-1959 period of the first few GATT Rounds provide useful information. In particular, we examine whether the average tariffs for the active GATT participants at its inception in 1947-what we refer to as the 'core'
GATT Contracting Parties of Australia, Canada, the UK and the US -had larger subsequent reductions in their average tariffs during the initial rounds than 'other' (comparison group) countries. We consider two definitions for the set of other comparison group countries: the first includes all other countries listed in Table 1 , a mix of initial GATT 1947 Contracting Parties and countries that only joined later; the second comprises only the eight other initial GATT 1947
Contracting Parties listed in Table 1 (Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, India, Netherlands, New
Zealand and Norway). Table 10 presents our regression estimates on average tariff data covering the years [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] . The data are in 'long-differences' in which the dependent variable is defined as the threeyear difference in trade-weighted average tariffs.
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The two main sets of regressors are dummy variables for the years (1947, 1950, 1953, 1956 and 1959) and year dummies interacted with an indicator for the importer being one of the four 'core' GATT Contracting Parties. In columns (1) and (2), the comparison group of countries includes all of the other countries listed in Table 1 for which data are available, and in columns (3) and (4) the comparison set of countries is only the other initial (non-core) GATT 1947 Contracting Parties. In columns (1) and (3), the annual percentage change in average tariffs is constructed using conventional methods, whereas the robustness checks provided in columns (2) and (4) use log differences in trade-weighted average tariffs.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 suggest that, when looking at three-year differences in tariffs, there is no (robust) statistically significant change in average tariffs across the full sample of countries in 1947, 1950, 1953, 1956 or 1959 . For the smaller sample of GATT 1947 Contracting 18 This is opposed to a regression framework analysing annual changes in tariffs, which yields qualitatively similar results. Focusing on three-year changes may better reflect the cumulative effect of a given tariff cut over a couple of years. Finally, while the data used cover 1944-1959, because the regressions examine three-year changes in average tariffs, the regressions ultimately cover changes in tariffs over the 1947-1959 period. Parties only (columns 3 and 4), there is evidence of a statistically significant increase in average tariffs across those countries in 1953 relative to their levels in 1950.
The main result of interest in Table 10 is seen in the bottom set of rows, which presents estimates of the interaction of the year dummies with an indicator for whether the country was one of the core GATT 1947 Contracting Parties -Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. Indeed, relative to the full sample of countries (columns 1 and 2), there is a negative and statistically significant differential estimate (−0.55 and −0.48, respectively) Finally, it is also worth noting for the core countries that, relative to the average across both the full sample of countries (columns 1 and 2) and the smaller sample of GATT 1947 18 Contracting Parties (columns 3 and 4), their pre-GATT 'starting point' trade-weighted tariffs were significantly higher in 1947 than they had been three years earlier (in 1944) . In particular, the column (1) estimate indicates that average tariffs for Australia, Canada, the UK and the US were 129 per cent higher in 1947 than in 1944. 19 Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful that these tariff increases reflected changes in applied tariff rates as opposed to changes in the composition of trade as a result of the end of World War II. For example, Canada did not change the rates in its tariff code during this period (Hart 2003) .
G. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to shed light on the height of tariff barriers on the eve of the 1947 Geneva conference that established the GATT and negotiated the first postwar tariff reductions. We find that the average tariff among the key GATT participants -the US, Western Europe and Japanwas about 22 per cent at the time of the first Geneva conference, significantly lower than the oftreported 40 per cent figure (World Bank, 1987) . This figure refers to the unweighted tariff average; the import-weighted tariff average would be much lower than this. In addition, we report limited econometric evidence of significant tariff reductions by the key early GATT participants -the core of the US, UK, Canada and Australia -but not for others in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine the economic effect of these tariff reductions, we should point out that the early tariff reductions were thought to have a muted impact on world trade flows, largely due to the presence of other non-tariff barriers at the time. In particular, the co-existence of import quotas and foreign exchange controls (European currencies Between 1944 and 1947, trade-weighted average tariffs in Australia increased from 8.6 to 27.9 per cent, in Canada from 6.5 to 11.4 per cent, and in the United Kingdom from 24.5 to 44.0 per cent. Among the core countries, only in the US did the tariffs fall between 1944 and 1947, from 10.6 to 8.2 per cent. Lloyd (2008) advises strong caution in interpreting the tariff figures for Australia during this period.
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As Curzon (1965, 80-81) notes: 'It must also be remembered that principally only in the United States (and Canada) were tariff cuts effective during the 1950s. In other countries quotas and exchange controls interfered sufficiently with the trade flow to make any measurement meaningless. ' And Brusse (1997) adds: 'While the average depth of the tariff cuts negotiated in 1947 stands out quite favorably compared to those of the subsequent rounds, the reductions equation and provide some evidence that the early GATT had a positive and significant effect on world trade. Pinning down exactly how the GATT boosted early postwar trade is thus an important topic for further research.
themselves hardly affected levels of protection. Many rates contained "extra margins" that could easily be cut without changing effective protection levels.' Woytinsky and Woytinsky (1955, 284-85) . GATT (1953a, 62) . 1955 data from Balassa (1961, 46) . Source: GATT (1953b, 22) . Preeg (1970, 208-11) . Preeg (1970, 277-78) . (1) and (3) is (X_t-X_t-3)/X_t-3 and in (2) and (4) 
